

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 13, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Subject: U.S. Policy for the Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities

NSC REVIEW  
COMPLETED,  
10/31/03

1. Following recent meetings between General Smith, Mr. Dulles, and myself, I am writing this memorandum to record our mutual understanding. In the case of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, I am addressing this memorandum to the persons above indicated, because of their familiarity with the subject matter.
2. In compliance with the Terms of Reference, dated February 17, 1954, a Sub-Committee of Messrs. Craig, Comstock, and Koens prepared a "Report on U.S. Policy for the Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities", dated June 8, 1954, under the general direction of the Chief of the Special Staff of the Operations Coordinating Board.
3. It was agreed at our meetings that the next step should be the establishment of a small high-level Committee, composed of State, Defense, and CIA representatives, to treat the subject further. This Committee would produce a paper which would
  - a. list Soviet vulnerabilities by categories (geographical, political, etc.);
  - b. indicate those vulnerabilities, exploitation of which by the U.S. is feasible and desirable, given existing resources; and
  - c. indicate those vulnerabilities, exploitation of which by the U.S. would be feasible and possibly desirable, given enhanced U.S. capabilities.

It was not thought that the paper to be produced by this Committee would be a long and exhaustive study, but limited to the matters covered above. Neither was it felt that at this time this Committee should deal with priorities among the vulnerabilities listed, because in determining priorities so much turns upon the circumstances at a particular time, or proposed specific courses of action, - although neither of these undertakings by the Committee were precluded.

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4. Mr. Dulles is working up a tentative list of Soviet vulnerabilities, based on views in the Central Intelligence Agency. This tentative list should be ready in the near future.

5. It is desirable for State, Defense, and CIA to indicate whom they will nominate to this Special Committee, which will operate under the Planning Board of the National Security Council. If the Committee begins in September its considerations, based on the "Report on U.S. Policy for the Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities" and the tentative list of Soviet vulnerabilities being prepared by CIA, it would be my hope that it could report to the Planning Board in October, and that the matter could come before the Council late in October, or early in November.

6. After talking with C. D. Jackson, General Smith, Mr. Dulles, and I thought that Max Milliken would be a good Chairman for the Committee, thus bringing an independent point of view to bear. Unless a contrary view is expressed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I would expect to ask Professor Milliken if he would serve, upon receiving your nominations for this Committee. If the Committee is to produce work which will be genuinely helpful, obviously we must have a high-level representation of the Departments concerned.

7. I am naming Mr. T. B. Keens, of the NSC Staff, to serve as Executive Secretary of this Committee.

*Robert Cutler*  
ROBERT CUTLER  
Special Assistant  
to the President

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